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This essay deals with the many connections between Brazil and China, as 
it examines the fundamental drivers of this accretive friendship. Brazil, like 
China, is a rapidly growing economic giant with a large resource base. Brazil 
has experienced an average growth of 7 per cent and China of 10 per cent. 
These growth rates require large amounts of energy sources, natural 
resources and raw materials. Both countries are positioned to benefit from 
increased rapprochement: China needs Brazil to supplement its rising 
commodities needs, and Brazil needs China to finance its industrial and 
manufacturing investments. Today, China is Brazil’s leading trade partner, 
replacing the United States and emerging as a viable ally at a time of waning 
hegemonic control. As large oil deposits lie 150 miles off the Brazilian coast, 
China is attentive to Brazil’s wishes, as well as to its desires to rightly develop 
the trillion dollar oil boom that is currently taking place. 
 




China is currently the world’s biggest energy user, the world’s fastest 
growing market for automobiles, and the world’s second-largest consumer of 
oil, having emerged as America’s strategic competitor in its search for natural 
gas, crude oil, and minerals throughout the world, most notably in Africa, 
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Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America (Jaffe and Lewis 2002; 
Zweig and Jianhai 2005; Kreft 2006; Lo 2008). Beijing seeks to increase its 
access to vast reserves of natural resources to feed its rapidly growing 
manufacturing and industrial sectors. In particular, China has been on a 
worldwide search to secure more iron-ore mines and mineral supply channels 
(Downs 2006; Kreft 2006). 
For a decade, China’s economy has grown at around 10 per cent annually 
based on low-cost labour, an undervalued currency, protected state-owned 
companies, and successful penetration of consumption-oriented Western 
markets (Naughton 2007; Friedman 2008). The figures speak for themselves: 
the gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the last seven years was 10.1 per 
cent; 9.9 per cent; 11.1 per cent; 11.4 per cent; 9.0 per cent; 8.7 per cent from 
2004 to 2009 respectively, and an estimated 9.5 per cent in 2010 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2010; Editorial 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). 
China accounts for 40 per cent of global growth in oil demand in the last six 
years, and its consumption is projected to rise from five million barrels per day 
in 2009 to 13 million barrels a day in 2015. Most of this oil demand will need 
to be imported given that indigenous sources are not sufficient to support the 
level growth experienced (United States Department of Energy 2010).  
In view of this evolving situation, Beijing tries to outwit big international 
resource companies by aggressively seeking out potential deals in countries 
that, for the most part, would benefit greatly from a steady and long-term 
demand for their commodity exports. Furthermore, Chinese resource-
oriented companies enjoy government help that, when needed, can tap into 
government aid in the form of grants and low-interest loans to secure major 
deals (Forero 2005). These companies pursue a combination of market and 
strategic objectives, rather than relying solely on commercial ones (Delamer et 
al. 2004; Downs 2006). 
Latin American countries, in recognition of Chinese needs and of Beijing’s 
explicit interests in the region, are exploring cooperative arrangements with 
China in the fields of agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacture, mining, 
and science and technology. According to the most recent report by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), by 
the middle of 2011, China will displace the European Union as Latin 
America’s second-largest trading partner. Today, in early 2011, China has 
replaced the United States as Brazil’s leading trade partner. Specifically, within 
Latin America, Brazil is playing not only a regionally but also a more globally 
assertive role, and this demeanour, some observers say, is nothing new given 
its economic and social growth (Williamson 2003). 
 Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, Brazil has continued 
to consolidate its position as the most influential actor in South America without 
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raising any sort of hegemonic suspicions. This assertiveness and influence is 
partly explained by Brazil’s young, vibrant, multicultural, and reasonably 
educated population (Skidmore 2009) that offers perennial promises for 
economic development and social progress; as does the country’s vast deposits 
of oil, gas and minerals, forests, and soybean plantations.  
The foreign perception is that Brazil is emerging as the “country of the 
future”, a nation-state that, if it continues on the steady improvement track, is 
poised to replace Germany as the world’s fifth largest economy by 2016 
(Editorial 2010d). Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva certainly 
believed this to be possible. He travelled around the country inaugurating 
projects and giving talks at conferences, forums, symposiums, and political 
gatherings telling constituencies that this was indeed so. To Brazil, at this 
moment, successfully managing the ongoing economic boom is a priority, as 
in the past it has unintentionally squandered its vast potential to grow and 
reach great-power status. 
In general, South America has a history of producing and exporting oil for 
more than a century, with most of its shipments flowing north, to the United 
States; but as globalization strengthened in the 80s, shipments started to find 
other destinations. As international energy markets homogenized the range of 
players buying and selling resources, countries like Brazil were able to place 
their oil at the disposal of China, or India, or any other country willing to buy 
oil (House International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
2005). It is for this reason that, in recent years, China’s voracious economy has 
brought it to Brazil and much of South America ‒ searching energy sources, 
raw materials and vast natural resources. 
 China, though, is not just interested in Brazil. According to Inter-American 
Development Bank officials, China’s foreign direct investments in the region 
include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
To be sure, in Beijing there is no such thing as rapprochement ‘exclusivity’. 
Much of South America has become crucial to China’s need for additional 
natural resources, raw materials, and more markets for its products. This 
focused interest can be partly explained given that the region hosts 560 million 
consumers and a combined gross domestic product of US$4 trillion. For 
example, China is interested in copper, nickel and tin from Chile, natural gas 
from Bolivia, oil from Ecuador and Venezuela, and precious woods from 
Colombia. As a sub-sector, mining is among China’s top priorities. In fact, so 
relevant is China’s nascent presence in the region that in response to Beijing’s 
direct requests, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have conferred on 
China the status of ‘free-market economy’ thereby strategically decreasing the 
potential impact that anti-dumping measures may have on inexpensive Chinese 
imports (Thompson 2004; Coatsworth and Williamson 2004; Editorial 2005).  
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To give an idea of China’s strategic interests in the region, between 2000 
and 2007, China’s trade with Latin America grew tenfold and reached US$142 
billion in 2008. This amount is 4.7 times less than America’s trade with the 
region, which in 2008 reached US$667 billion. Moreover, in 2008, the Chinese 
President Hu Jintao visited South America as part of a country-hopping travel 
schedule with a dozen government minister and hundreds of businessmen 
and industry representatives to offer, negotiate, and sign a total of 39 trade 
agreements and memorandums of understanding related to energy, minerals, 
and agricultural commodities. This tactical attention is not at all surprising: 
China’s annual regional trade is over US$140 billion, and because Beijing’s 
economic priorities have nothing to do with the promotion of democracy and 
human rights, heads of South American states are lured in by this “no strings 
attached” approach to doing business (Forero 2005; Brookes 2008).  
Moreover, China’s foreign direct investment in Latin America reached 
roughly US$25 billion in 2008-2009, making up 14.6 per cent of China’s total 
foreign investments (Chinese Ministry of Commerce 2010). In 2010 alone, 
China invested about US$17 billion in Brazil in areas from mines to oil to 
manufacturing. However, Brazilian manufacturers have complained that 
waves of cheap imports have decimated some export sectors (Colitt 2011). 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY 
APPROACH  
Through an extensive literature review that covers an array of books, 
reports, working papers, essays, scholarly articles, and media sources, this 
paper examines some of the most contemporarily relevant Sino-Brazilian 
linkages and the mutual benefits that arise from them.  
A number of keywords such as Brazil, China, Copper, Economic Diplomacy, 
Energy, Gas, International Relations, Capital Investments, Iron-Ore, Latin 
America, Minerals, Natural Resources, Petroleum, Raw Materials, Sino-Brazilian, 
and Oil were typed into Google Scholar and JSTOR to identify and select the 
most pertinent and robust writings on the subject from academics, 
commentators, doyens, experts, journalists, observers, and scholars.  
The headings were carefully chosen to guide readers through the different 
issues explored. It asks: How is China liaising with Brazil to secure long-term 
purveyance of natural resources? This question guides the discussion throughout, 
as well as seeking to make selected linkages to issues arising in political, economic, 
cultural, demographic, diplomatic, social, technological, legal, regulatory, and 
ecological and environmental domains.  
This research contributes to an increasing body of work in modern energy 
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diplomacy from authors such as Bobo Lo, Heinrich Kreft, David Zweig, Erica 
Downs, Amy Jaffe, Ian Taylor, and Andrew Monaghan, among many others. 
This paper differs from previous studies by its take on multidimensional linkages, 
and how these are likely to be perceived by Europe and the United States.  
The paper begins by listing accords, agreements, pacts, and treaties between 
Brazil and China. These details are meant to provide a sense of the depth and 
breadth of their mutual interests, as well as the incentives behind interstate 
rapprochements. This is followed by a pragmatic analysis of the numerous 
mechanisms and tools used to accomplish goals and objectives. A conclusion 
offers summary findings and tries to make sense of the contributions of this 




THE BRAZIL-CHINA CONNECTION:  
FROM ACTIONS TO RESULTS 
First, and foremost, China is Brazil’s largest trading partner and biggest 
export market, replacing the United States. China imports large quantities of beef, 
chicken, coffee, orange juice, sugar, and tobacco, for all of which Brazil is the 
world’s leading exporter. Hinged by this economic reciprocity, a strategic 
partnership began to take shape between China and Brazil on the basis of strong 
bilateral trade and other shared interests, such as energy security. Brazil is currently 
experiencing China’s “outward strategy”, as Beijing’s coffers overflow with more 
than US$2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. China has directed its state-owned 
companies to scavenge the Brazilian territory for opportunities.  
In fact, according to Brazil’s Central Bank, Chinese direct investment in 
Brazil increased to US$367 million in the first half of 2010 from US$73 
million in the same period of 2009. This represents over 50 per cent rise in 
investments. As 2011 unfolds, there are indications that China is leveraging 
the protracted economic recovery around the world to ‘pick and choose’ 
energy companies at discounted prices. In an environment where foreign 
firms, conglomerates, and multinational corporations are starving for cash and 
credit market tightness, the countries with the most space to benefit are those 
that are sitting on piles of foreign currency reserves. 
In addition to natural gas and oil exploration, Chinese investments involve a 
factory to manufacture oil and gas equipment, an automobile plant, a steel 
mill, a shipyard, and port infrastructure development. In Beijing, government 
officials push aggressively to invest in foreign manufacturing and the industrial 
sector to bolster the country’s presence, its image, and its political influence. It 
is noteworthy that, in 2010 and 2011, Chinese companies from Sinochem 
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Group to State Grid Corporation of China announced deals or possible 
acquisitions in Latin American agriculture, natural gas, mining, petroleum, and 
electrical power as the nation seeks to secure commodity supplies to feed its 
rapidly expanding economy. 
Today’s China-Brazil picture differs completely from that of merely seven 
years ago. In 2004, China’s imports from and exports to Brazil amounted to 
US$8.7 billion and US$3.7 billion, respectively. But even then, Beijing was already 
making announcements of tens of billions of dollars in energy-related deals and 
investments (Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2005). To place the magnitude of current 
Chinese investments in Brazil into context, in the first eight months of 2010, 
Beijing invested over US$20 billion in Brazil, ten times more than all of China’s 
previous investment in the country. Chinese technocrats and industrialists have 
developed a deep understanding of Brazilian political economy. They have quickly 
learned the strong links between authority, people, money, respect, and political 
power. Armed with this knowledge ‒and with plenty of cash to spend- many 
Chinese state and non-state companies have arrived in Brazil to negotiate a 
modern high-speed rail construction contract, to buy huge tracts of land in order 
to plant soybeans and other crops, to build modern vehicle motor manufacturing 
plants, to realize telecommunications infrastructure, to construct high-volume 
steel mills, and to purchase a stake in Brazil’s electrical grid system. If this 
continues, China is on track to become Brazil’s number one investor for 2010 
and 2011 (Lyons 2009).  
The following examples illustrate some of the Chinese transactions in Brazil 
that so far have been reported by national and international sources. The East 
China Mineral Exploration and Development Bureau, a quasigovernmental 
mining entity backed by the Jiangsu province in China, signed in early March 
2010 an agreement with Itaminas Comercio de Minérios SA to acquire the 
company along with its iron-ore mining operations in the Brazilian eastern 
state of Minas Gerais for US$1.2 billion. This company buyout was driven by 
the Itaminas mine which has an estimated 1.3 billion tons of iron-ore reserves, 
with mineral outputs flowing via direct railway to Rio de Janeiro’s port 
(Mayner 2010). To place the situation in its current context, it is relevant to 
underscore that Brazil is a leading producer of iron-ore for regional and 
international markets. In fact, Brazilian mining giant Vale Minerals China Co., 
a competitor of Itaminas mines, expects to produce 450 million tons of very 
high quality iron-ore annually by 2015 (Editorial 2011). 
Also, in Porto do Açu, 175 miles north of Rio de Janeiro, port workers are 
busy building a two-mile long pier to accommodate the mega-tankers to 
transport crude oil and the monumental vessels that will transport iron-ore 
and other minerals to China’s ravenous metallurgic industries. However, the 
Sao Paulo State Industrial Federation claims ‘unfairness’ and has called on the 
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Brazilian government to take serious steps to stop the wave of purchases of local 
mining assets by Chinese companies (Editorial 2010e). This is not surprising since 
it is well known in foreign investment circles that Chinese state-owned companies 
have an edge over American and other multinational energy companies bound by 
internationally-mandated restrictions related to anti-corruption, accountability, 
bidding, and transparency that are intended to promote fair competition. It seems 
that, when it comes down to overseas investments, China plays by its own rules 
(Lyons 2009; Pomfret 2010), and this is a fact that local industrialist are holding on 
to press their claims with the government.  
From mining we shift our focus to oil. One of the most important Chinese 
firms in international crude oil exploration, production, and distribution is the 
Beijing-based China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, also known as 
Sinopec. It controls dozens of subsidiaries around the world, including the 
US-listed Sinopec Corp., with principal businesses in exploration, production, 
and trading of petroleum and natural gas, refining, and sales of petroleum 
products, and sales of chemicals. With production levels of 296.8 million 
barrels of crude oil and 293.06 billion cubic feet of natural gas in 2008, 
Sinopec is the second largest producer of crude oil and natural gas in China 
(Sinopec 2010). The other behemoth is CNOOC, that is, the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC Limited 2010). These two corporations 
are active and operational in Brazil, seeking and securing as many natural 
resource deals as possible. More precisely, their presence in Brazilian territories 
is justified by the rapidly-developing trillion dollar story around oil that is 
estimated to raise Brazil’s production levels to over 6 million barrels per day. 
At this level of output Brazil could easily become the third or fourth producer 
of crude oil in the world and a massive exporter. In the below paragraphs, we 
will take a closer look at these evolving dynamics.   
As noted above, part of the reason for Sinopec and CNOOC presence is 
that Brazil’s most substantial crude oil reserves lie 150 miles off the coast and a 
few miles beneath ocean, rock, and unstable layers of salts and geological 
formations. Reaching it requires the creativity and expertise of the oil 
industry’s top companies. In fact, Brazil’s national oil company, Petroleo 
Brasileiro SA, or Petrobras, recently discovered a colossal reserve (arguably the 
largest discovery of oil reserves in the past 35 years, according to preliminary 
estimates) of crude oil buried seven thousand metres beneath a thick layer of 
salt on the Atlantic Ocean floor that sparked an internecine strife among 
Brazilian provinces competing for their fair share of royalties (Editorial 2010f). 
Petrobras ‒Brazil’s main oil producer- along with Sinopec and CNOOC have 
studied the feasibility and viability of joint operations in exploration, 
processing, and distribution of this and other oil reserves in their respective 
countries, and also in other regions of the world too. 
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Aside from direct investments by China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
and China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Petrobras received US$10 billion 
from the China Development Bank as a down payment on future business: both 
the private and public sectors are active in Brazil’s investment landscapes. Also, to 
give a dimension of China’s recent investments, both CNOOC and Sinopec 
offered at least US$7 billion for Brazilian oil assets and a stake in OGX Petroleo & 
Gas Participacoes SA of Rio de Janeiro (Editorial 2010g). 
Furthermore, in the first quarter of 2010, the Brazilian government reached a 
binding agreement on the order of US$1 billion with Sinopec to build a natural gas 
pipeline that will cross Brazil. In addition to this agreement, Chinese officials are 
intently listening to rumours of plans to build a cross-country pipeline to transport 
crude oil to the Pacific where it would be loaded onto mega-tankers that are too 
big to use the Panama Canal. Another speculative proposal involves Colombia 
laying a pipeline to carry hydrocarbons to Colombia’s Pacific ports for shipments 
to Asia (Lyons 2009; Pomfret 2010; Slater 2010). All these ideas seem favourable 
under a climate of high gas and crude oil prices. Whether these rumours and 
project proposals are true or not, for its part, Beijing prefers to deal directly with 
governments in oil-producing countries and to use its vast wealth to reduce the 
role of big foreign oil companies that have long been the traditional intermediaries 
(and price inflators) between oil producers and oil consumers. 
To further consolidate bilateral relations and future investments, in April 
2010, Brazil and China signed a joint action plan for 2010-2014 and reached 
agreements in several economic sectors. However, foreign investments and 
bilateral trade are not always smooth. For instance, in Brazil, manufacturers 
and industrialists have accused Beijing of dumping products in their domestic 
markets and this has caused an avalanche of calls to the Brazilian government 
to levy new tariffs on some Chinese imports. These selective demands are 
particularly worrisome to some Brazilian businessmen as they intend to make 
the most of a non-commodity boom precipitated by free and open access to 
old and new markets coupled with a sustained global economic recovery. 
Also, it must not be forgotten that Brazil has both a solid manufacturing base 
and a large auto industry. In fact, aviation giant Embraer, the world’s third 
largest aircraft manufacturer, has sizeable operations in Brazil.  
Additionally, several neighbouring countries (i.e. Argentina, Chile, Peru, 
Colombia, and others) have voiced their concerns about Beijing’s conspicuously 
aggressive efforts to win vast access to energy reserves and mineral deposits in 
the region. These countries worry that China’s rising presence could lead to 
economic manacling and neo-colonialism (Moxley 2010). More specifically, 
China’s entry to Brazil (and Venezuela) raises anxiety among South American 
countries because of the fear of becoming less attractive markets to local oil-
producers and, thus, more dependent on foreign oil imports at a time when 
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international reserves remain relatively tight. On a more individual level, energy 
experts suspect that Chinese engineers and resource officials will use accords, 
agreements, deals, and pacts as a tool to learn as much as possible from Brazilian 
and Venezuelan heavy-oil refining technologies that for years have been adapted 
to local conditions: access to confidential operational information grants China 
more leverage and therefore more negotiation powers. 
In addition to accords with Brazil, Beijing has signed investment deals with 
Venezuela and Peru (Erikson 2006; Romero 2010), both of which represent 
largely untapped markets, and is also exploring possible arrangements with 
Bolivia and Colombia (Lum 2009). One example can illustrate that Brazil is not 
unique in sealing multibillion dollar deals: in early 2010 the CNOOC, eager to 
expand its crude oil reserves to meet increasing domestic demand, paid US$3 
billion for a 50 per cent stake in an Argentinean privately-owned oil and gas 
group called Bridas (Editorial 2010h). From a strictly geopolitical point of 
view, and in our expressed attempt to link Sino-Brazilian relations beyond 
economic and energy diplomacy, it is relevant to note that China supports 
Venezuela’s military and Cuba’s air defence systems, two meretricious actions 
that the United States is following closely. 
In summary, China is driven towards Brazil by its need for privileged access to 
raw materials, minerals (especially of iron-ore), and hydrocarbons. Obviously, Brazil 
and China are both emerging market economies that share similar challenges in 
international markets, and these similarities inexorably link the two countries’ 
interests. But still, some hesitation lingers. After studying the actions, behaviours, 
interventions, and consequences of some overseas investments by the China 
National Petroleum Co. and Sinopec, Brazil and others are quickly realizing that 
Chinese private and public companies are competing in their own turf for natural 
resources and market shares. And the rules of Chinese game-playing are quite 
different (i.e. less predatory) from the ones traditionally practiced in Latin America.   
As a side note, in recent past Sinopec has been mired with allegations of 
unethical activity. In response, since 2007, the company requires employees to 
sign anti-corruption pledges, inserts anti-bribery clauses into legal contracts, and 
implemented an online-based corporate procurement program (Areddy 2010). 
 
 
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN A CHANGED 
WORLD: SO FAR, SO GOOD 
The previous section notes that, from the repertoire of world regions 
tapped, Latin America is rapidly becoming a recurrent destination for China in 
its global hunt for energy and resources. Beijing’s strategic interests in Latin 
America in general and Brazil in particular also highlight Washington’s lack of 
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attention towards the region. In fact, it is often said that this geopolitical 
disregard was further exacerbated after the terrorist attacks on the United States’ 
soil on 11 September 2001. This benign neglect is all the more disconcerting if 
one looks at the region as a potential market block that has increased its 
purchasing power: from 2003 to 2008 Latin America enjoyed a prolonged 
period of healthy growth averaging 4.3 per cent with low inflation and a balance-
of-payments surplus (ECLAC 2008). Moreover, in the second decade of this 
still young millennium, Latin America is positioned to rise as a vibrant 
international market and as a suitable destination for more foreign investments. 
Regionally, as well as globally, the balance of power is starting to shift to 
countries like Brazil whose political clout and economic weight has grown 
considerably in recent years. For example, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 
Olympics will be held in Brazil. These “political victories” can be seen as 
announcing the country’s arrival as an accountable and respectable international 
player. For its part, the European Union has taken note of these commercial 
and diplomatic overtures. This is not surprising given that Europe is still Latin 
America’s biggest foreign investor and aid donor; however, Chinese trade with 
the region has grown much faster than Europe’s over the past decade (Pomfret 
2010; Editorial 2010i).  
In addition to the above, Brasília has been clever in raising its diplomatic 
game, acting the part of an influential regional power with a significant global 
impact. This comes in part because it is the “B” in the vibrant economic club 
of Brazil, India, Russia, and China, or “BRIC”, thus garnering the country 
leverage and high visibility. Furthermore, it has successfully integrated into the 
global economy by boosting exports, stabilizing its currency, and polishing its 
international image. Furthermore, some other facts about Brazil’s reputation 
and evolving prestige include the world’s largest cattle industry, the world’s 
greenest economy, a sophisticated biofuel industry, a modern financial hub (in 
San Paolo), deriving 80 per cent of energy needs from hydropower, hosting 14 
per cent of fresh water in the world, a privileged abundance on natural 
resources, nutrient-rich arable farmlands, and a sustained average GDP 
growth of around 7 per cent, which is three times that of the United States. 
During the Cold War, countries like Brazil ‒as well as China and India- 
tiptoed and carefully aligned themselves according to the prevailing balance of 
power in the bipolar competition between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. This is no longer the case. New patterns and habits of international 
coordination and cooperation are emerging in place of deference to US 
leadership. China is becoming a partner of choice. Another reason for preferring 
China over the United States is that relations between Brazil and the US have 
lost momentum as a result of growing differences over policies and trade 
imbalances. These differences threaten to upset the delicate balance with a 
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country that is pivotal to American interests in its closest region (Hakim 2004; 
Slater 2010). Also, several instances of strategic marginalization are taking place. 
The rationale behind this is that, by excluding the United States, smaller groups 
of Latin American countries are learning to operate within deepening patterns of 
regional economic cooperation and political coordination. These groups of 
countries are either seeking stronger cohesion among them or welcoming 
economic and diplomatic overtures from China (also from India and Russia).  
Commentators believe that in adopting a low-key approach and tactically 
managing relations, confrontations within the Western Hemisphere can be 
largely avoided (Li 2007; Editorial 2010j). Some other nations around the 
world have also demonstrated their explicit preference for Chinese 
investments by acceding to Beijing’s whims and desires, while others have 
been more conservative while remaining active in bilateral trade (Burgos and 
Ear 2010; 2011a; 2011b). One of the reasons for this sustained bilateral trade 
is that China’s official trade barriers are lower than those in other big emerging 
economies. For example, in 2008, the average applied tariff was 9.6 per cent in 
China compared to 13 per cent in India and 13.6 per cent in Brazil. On the 
other hand, according to estimates from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), non-tariff barriers such as import 
quotas or restrictions on foreign involvement in government tenders were 
equivalent to an added tax of 9.4 per cent on imports into China (UNCTAD 
2010; Editorial 2010k; OECD/IDB 2010). 
So, one may ask, how is it possible that China is received with open arms 
and able to invest wherever it goes? The answer to this question lies in 
straightforward arithmetic. Given that financing can often account for two-
fifths of the cost of an entire project, exceedingly low-interest rate credit lines 
are attractive to any foreign investor, regardless of geographical location. 
Knowing this key fact, China expertly uses low-interest rate financing. It 
furnishes credit accords and loans in the order of billions of dollars at 
incredibly low-interest rates that can stretch beyond twenty years. In some 
cases, China has extended credit lines and billions of dollars in loans at less 
than one per cent interest rate; with some loans originating at the China 
Development Bank Corporation, the state-run bank for public works projects. 
The size of Chinese banks is so large that such banks have the financial 
capacity not only to administratively handle these loans but to also support a 
major investment expansion of Chinese firms overseas. All this underscores 
China’s importance as an emerging lender of last resort rivalling the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to a certain extent the World Bank. 
At a disadvantage, however, are the member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which agreed long ago 
not to use low rate financing as a competitive tool to secure deals (OECD 
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2010). This is because, over the years, the OECD Competition Committee 
has done significant and relevant work in the areas of abuse, dominance and 
monopolisation, cartels and bid rigging, mergers, prosecutions and laws, and 
regulation of industry sectors, based on specific demands from member 
countries. 
The confluence of global financial markets on the verge of collapse and a 
tight credit environment has enabled China to seal enviable deals and secure its 
future. Evidently, in the usual pragmatic utilitarianism that often characterizes 
emerging powers, Brazil and China play down areas of bilateral disagreements, 
and focus on shared commitments to economic stability, trade promotion, and 
energy security ‒ two countries with long roads ahead of them. 
A key component of China’s strategy to guarantee access to Brazilian 
resources is to build close ties with top officials via high-level visits of Chinese 
leaders leading to pronouncements of strategic partnerships between countries. 
Moreover, a government change in Brasília could lead to a reduced reliance on 
the US as sole guarantor of Brazil’s security and offer China a more expanded 
role. Western analysts believe that China’s continued penetration into the 
Western Hemisphere could have profound economic and political implications 
for the US. With less oil available to the American market, the US could be 
forced to start seeking oil elsewhere, primarily in the Middle East, hence 
becoming more dependent on an already belligerently volatile region (Mitchell 
2001; Luft 2009; Colitt 2011). 
 The Hu administration, with its rapid growth and widespread tentacles, now 
has the opportunity to serve as an ‘enabler’ of initiatives for deeper cooperation 
beyond energy in a number of regions of the world where this is still weak, from 
Africa to Latin America to Southeast Asia (Luxner 2005; Lai 2010). At the same 
time, the Brazilian government can use its nascent leadership and diplomatic 
arsenal to tackle global climate change which is borderless (i.e. transnational) and 
involves a multiplicity of private and public stakeholders. 
Furthermore, Brazil is eyeing improvements in its public sector to climb 
closer to the levels attained in rich, industrialized nations. The coherent 
utilization of gas, minerals, and oil is assisting in fulfilling those dreams given 
that high commodity prices can strengthen government finances and allow for 
a big increase in social spending. The Lula governments’ platform to win the 
elections back in 2002 focused much on social programmes (Hall 2006) that 
reached out to the poor and rural populations at the margin of society, and 
these projects and programmes are positioned to be strengthened, in light of 
the spill-over effects of China’s incoming and rapidly increasing economic and 
energy diplomacy (Samuels 2004).  
The impact of populist actions by governments to garner condescendence 
and favour from constituencies should not be underestimated. For example, 
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Lula da Silva ‒formerly a metal worker- is said to have turned to country 
around. His policies included an infusion of cash (US$115 per household) to 
the lowest social strata that resulted in lifting 21 million people out of poverty 
and into the middle class. The aggregate rise in disposable incomes precipitated 
an expansion of sales in refrigerators, air conditioners, automobiles, motorcycles, 
electronics, and household items. 
To sum up, there are numerous countries with which China can establish 
commercial relationships, but not all of them carry tactical relevance or strategic 
interest. As a whole, China adapts the style and substance of its energy and 
foreign policy to the emergence of a more interconnected and multipolar world 
order (Meidan et al. 2009). Beijing uses its huge foreign reserves and low-interest 
rate loans to muscle its way through Brazil and other South American countries. 
Big economies in Latin America are aware of the opportunities that a long-
lasting relationship with China can bring and most of them are snatching them 
on the spot. China’s capital investments mean job creation, increased trade, and 
sustained economic growth. In a way, Brazil follows a path similar to its 
neighbours but, at the same, differs from them. The government of Lula da 
Silva sought more than just economic benefits. Now that it is part of BRIC, the 
elite group of emerging market economies, it has much bigger ambitions. 
Brazil, in fact, seeks a more mature, steady, and solid relationship with Beijing, 
based on a mutually beneficial partnership, instead of the last five decades of 
imposed leadership from Washington (Wesson 1981). The deepening cooperation 
between Brazil and China also serves as a further catalyst to the process of growing 
transcontinental consultation on addressing common global challenges. These 
challenges are related to climate change, the collective management of the global 
economy, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the UN within an international 
legal framework. A careful allocation of attention between novel and traditional 
powers (i.e. China, India, and the USA) along with judicious distribution of 
economic diplomacy may very well guide the necessary policy adjustments that 
might offer Brazil the best chance to play a positive role in the areas meaningful for 
the Lula/Rousseff administration. As for China, intercourse with Brazil not only 
staves off criticism stemming from its dealing with kleptocratic regimes in Africa and 
fundamentalists in Central Asia, but also anchors an ally in a hemisphere that is ripe 




For two decades, the Chinese Communist Party has attained an impressive 
list of achievements, such as double-digit growth rates under authoritarian 
capitalism, pragmatic foreign policies, confrontation avoidance with the 
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Europe and the United States, and a systematic and methodical gaining of 
international prestige and influence. Most palpably, China has experienced and 
continues to experience tremendous (and enviable) economic growth. To 
sustain this growth, it must keep the wheels of its manufacturing and industrial 
sectors turning. As a result, it is driven by the need for privileged access to raw 
materials and hydrocarbons. In this global search it has found Brazil, a country 
with vast lands and natural resources. But it turns out that Brazil has found 
China too, also a fellow member of BRIC.  
Obviously, for these countries to establish a cordial working relationship they 
must want something from each other. In general, these interests can be 
diplomatic, economic, political, military, social, physical, strategic, and/or 
technological, among many others. From their actions and policies one can try to 
comprehend their incentives and motivations. For example, the Sino-Brazilian 
connection appears to be grounded on diplomatic, economic, physical, and 
strategic interests. Below follows a brief examination of these specific interests. 
Diplomatically, Beijing is bolstering China’s diplomatic presence in the 
Southern cone as a manoeuvre to limit ‒or at least make difficult- Taiwan’s 
relations with Latin American countries with whom it has active relations 
(Watson 2004; Erikson and Chen 2007). A reunified China is a paramount 
ambition. Beijing does not give up the idea of bringing together of all of the 
territories controlled by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Republic of China (ROC) under a single political entity. For its part, Brazil 
feels no compunction to verbalise its global ambitions. One of these revolves 
around a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). To 
this end, in early 2010, China hinted that it might support Brazil’s dream of 
becoming a permanent UNSC member (Pomfret 2010). Also, to make public 
display of its solidified credentials, Brazil views the discourse of anthropogenic 
global warming as an opportunity to exploit its comparative advantages as 
premier exporter of sugarcane-based ethanol and, arguably, a defender of the 
Amazon forest. Most passionately, like China, Brazil wants to be regarded and 
treated as an equally important, responsible, and consultable player in 
international affairs (Bulmer-Thomas 2010). 
Economically, both Brazil and China are strategically and structurally well 
positioned to emerge vibrant and strong from the current economic slowdown 
and, as a consequence, to continue to underpin their long-term potential for 
shared global leadership. As of this writing, China is Brazil’s largest trading 
partner and biggest export market. Furthermore, by the mid 2011, China will 
displace the European Union as Latin America’s second-largest trading partner. 
Moreover, what has been seen in the last decade is that the Chinese economic 
model is based on heavy importation of commodities, including agricultural 
items, and using those commodities very efficiently in manufacturing and 
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industrial processes to produce goods. These goods ‒which were produced by 
paying low wages- are then exported to rich countries. This has proved a very 
lucrative business for the Chinese. However, for the system to work smoothly 
into the future, it must have unrestricted access to commodities. In this context, 
disruptions to raw material supplies are viewed as vulnerabilities, so part of the 
reason for Beijing’s convenient marriage of economic, foreign, and energy 
policies and strategies is to buy into the supply channels of critical commodities 
all around the world. It would be wrong, however, to believe that everyone 
thinks that China will survive the ongoing crisis. Minxin Pei, a senior associate at 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, claims that slow growth and 
rising unemployment will test Beijing’s resilience (Pei 2009). 
Physically, China’s global resource quest emphasizes securing energy sources 
(natural gas and crude oil), natural resources (agricultural commodities, rubber, 
and timber) and raw materials (minerals such as copper, gold, iron-ore, nickel, 
silver, and tin). In moving ahead with plans for resource-related investments, the 
Chinese sit at South American negotiation tables without human rights or good 
governance demands. They arrive ready to invest billions of dollars and to 
negotiate the best possible terms-of-transactions. In Brazil, Beijing has landed 
accords and deals on natural gas and crude oil explorations, railways, soybean 
farming, manufacturing plants, telecommunications infrastructure, steel mills, 
and electricity generation projects. International commentators and scholars 
critical of China’s global resources quest fail to realize that Chinese funding of 
gas and oil projects around the globe ultimately means cheap energy for the 
global commons. This is because most of the world’s natural gas and crude oil 
are sold on the international spot markets to the highest available bidder and 
China’s largesse of extending preferential credit lines to gas and oil producing 
countries should keep gas and oil prices from increasing simply by the mere fact 
that global supply of gas and oil will rise (especially once Brazil starts pumping 6 
million barrels daily). 
Strategically, Beijing is allocating monies cautiously in a broad range of 
diversified investments, with larger ambitions in mind. As per Chinese work 
style, these are well-thought out steps that are prerequisites for a longer term 
relationship yet at the same time they are small enough (in comparison to 
other project elsewhere, e.g. in Nigeria) to easily be called-up should the 
economic, political, or social conditions dramatically change in a region that 
has not had a history of deep rapprochement with East Asia (Woodard 1981; 
Jaffe and Lewis 2002). Geopolitical interests also fit under the umbrella of 
strategic ones. China, being communist, identifies easily with leftist approaches 
to governance. In relation to this, commentators note that in essence there are 
two lefts in Latin America. The first is a moderate left once led by Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva (and now by Dilma Rousseff, a former Chief of Staff), and the 
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second is a radical left led by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (Reid 2007; 
Castañeda 2008). Most importantly, Brazil and Venezuela are not hostile to 
each other. In fact, at Brazil’s insistence, Venezuela was invited to join 
MERCOSUR (Spanish for Mercado Común del Sur ‒ Common Market of 
the South). The two countries are the driving force behind a plan for regional 
defence, a project for political integration, and a new development bank for 
South America. The ability of Chávez and Lula to work together across a 
broad range of interests signals South American leaders’ desire to reduce US 
influence and to enhance the latent capacity of the sub-region to diligently 
resolve its own problems without disruptive interferences from external 
sources (Brookes 2005; Bulmer-Thomas 2010). 
Although geographically speaking the countries south of the Rio Bravo 
(part of the Mexico‒US border) are still in the United States sphere of 
influence, by itself geography no longer determines destiny. This is most 
vividly evidenced by China’s rapprochement with Brazil, and other Latin 
American countries, which acted assertively on opportunities to build bridges 
in areas where US influence had for long been on the decline, or, to a point, 
not existent. Indeed, the Sino-Brazilian relationship goes beyond economics: 
there is talk that Brazil could train Chinese pilots on its aircraft carriers. This 
signals mutual collaborative desires in military and geostrategic spheres that 
pose threat to regional hegemonies. Where does this leave Europe and the 
United States? Few would disagree that classical hegemonic powers are 
adapting, albeit slowly, to a new tripartite world order. We sincerely believe 
that Washington must design and implement fresh strategies that will still 
allow the United States to thrive in a multivectoral world where past roles are 
increasing being contested. Otherwise, the US risks becoming the next cranky 
Britain or the next Old Europe. 
From afar it all looks and sounds good, positive, and rosy but a closer 
examination of information sources reveals that there are a few kinks in the 
narratives that have surfaced in response to Chinese presence in the region 
related to dumping of products, loss of market share, unfair competition, and 
corruption allegations. Also, critics of this newfound strategic union are 
finding ways to spread the notion that China is more of a strategic competitor 
than a strategic partner. Luckily for critics, this sentiment is gaining traction 
through region-wide access to radio, online blogging, newspapers, and a 
growing range of satellite television channels that help shape opinions and 
reactions to Chinese investments in Brazil and South America. The United 
States is also raising sensitive issues. In addition to concerns over energy 
security, American analysts and US officials have expressed anxiety regarding 
Brazilian-Chinese cooperation in satellite and rocket technology (Salameh 
2010). Moreover, the West, in general, has grown tired of China’s currency 
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value suppression ‒that is, the undervaluation of the Yuan- and has repeatedly 
asked China to revalue its currency to little avail. On this matter, the Chinese 
government finds itself in a quandary. If the officialdom in Beijing allows its 
currency to appreciate rapidly to reduce inflation and quench Western 
demands it could drive down exports and speed unemployment. If it fails to 
control inflation, social unrest and popular revolt will quickly unfold.   
 The narrowing of the relative levels of economic, military, and political 
power between America and the rest of the world has created a more levelled 
arena for Brazil and China to reassert their newfound confidence and 
international influence. At least, in the near future, there is little likelihood that 
Sino-Brazilian relations are going to cease. There is hope, however, that this 
alliance will be beneficial to the world at large. In the end, this essay places the 
Brazil-China connection in terms of expediency, pragmatism, and 
utilitarianism that reflect the mutually beneficial outcomes of rapprochement. 
The body of scholarly work in Latin American studies benefits from clearer 
















Diagram: Sino-Brazilian relations centred on natural resources linking to 
other realms 
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